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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Collins Ochieng plead guilty to injury to children on May 9, 2005. The district
court sentenced Mr. Ochieng to a unified term of ten years, with three years fixed, and
placed Mr. Ochieng on probation for a period of ten years. (R., p.57.) Mr. Ochieng was
subsequently subject to deportation proceedings as a result of his conviction,
transferred out of state and to unsupervised probation. On May 29, 2007, Mr. Ochieng
filed a Motion for Obtaining an Order Modifying the Original Conviction and Sentence
(hereinafter, Motion). The district court treated the Motion as both a motion to reduce
his sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, and a petition for post-conviction relief
brought pursuant to the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Action, § 19-4901 et seq.
The district court held the Motion as untimely under both avenues of relief.
Mr. Ochieng filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the district court's order
denying his Motion, which the district court also denied. Mr. Ochieng contends on
appeal that his Motion was properly considered a petition for post-conviction relief, and
that district erred in summarily dismissing the petition as untimely.

Mr. Ochieng

contends that the district court erred further in failing to give Mr. Ochieng notice of its
intent to dismiss the petition, and in failing to rule on his motion for appointment of
counsel prior to summarily dismissing his petition.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Collins Ochieng is a 35 year old man, who was born and raised in Kenya,
Africa. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.1, 4). He immigrated to

the United States in 2004 and established permanent residency. (PSI, p.3.) In 2005,
he was enrolled as a nursing student at the University of Idaho.

(PSI, p.5.)

Mr. Ochieng's first language is Dholuo, and his second language is Swahili. (R., p.64,
Part 3, 7 1.) He is only partially fluent in the English language. (R., p.64, Part 3, 7 1.)
Mr. Ochieng plead guilty to Injury to Children on May gth, 2005. (R., p.44.) The
district court ordered a Presentence Investigation Report. (R., p.45.) On September 6,
2005, the district court sentenced Mr. Ochieng to a unified term of ten years, with three
years fixed, and placed Mr. Ochieng on probation for a period of ten years. (R., p.57.)
Sometime before July 13, 2006, Mr. Ochieng was deported as a result of his conviction.
(See R., p.68; Letter to the Honorable N. Randy Smith, from John Warner, Idaho
Department of Corrections, dated July 14, 2006.) He was transferred to an Immigration
and Naturalization Services holding facility in Aurora, Colorado. (See R., pp.68, 72 - 3.)
He was also placed on unsupervised probation. (See Letter to the Honorable N. Randy
Smith, from John Warner, ldaho Department of Corrections, dated July 14, 2006,
attached Request and Order of Discharge, dated July 31, 2006.)
On January 6, 2006, Mr. Ochieng wrote to the district court asking for assistance.
(R., p.67.) Mr. Ochieng stated:
I am your humble subject and bring this to your attention because I'm at a
loss as to what has happened in my case since I was before you last on
September 2005.
My former attorney, Mr. Kelly Kumm had promised to give me an
understanding of my sentence outcome and wanted to discuss something about
a rule thirty-five. He never did this and I have not heard from him since he
notified me by letter that he was withdrawing from my case.
Since then I have had no one to advice or counsel me regarding my rights
and obligation, am therefore respectfully asking the court to assign me a counsel
to assist me understand what is happening with my case because it appears that
there is considerable discrepancy between what I recollect from your courtroom,
what I received in writing and what has actually happened to me here in your jail.

Attached herewith is the required financial documentation certifying my
eligibility [sic]
(R., p.67.)

The district court did not respond to Mr. Ochieng's letter and, instead,

apparently forwarded it to Mr. Kumm, who at that time, was still counsel of record for
Mr. Ochieng. (See R., pp.75 - 76, Notice of Withdrawal, dated July 3, 2007.)
Two weeks later, Mr. Ochieng sent another letter to the district court pleading for
assistance with his case. The letter stated:
RE: SEEKING FOR HELP
Dear Sir,
It is with utter sorrow and grief that I am earnestly pleading with you
honorable judge to kindly reconsider my case; you have the power and
means.
I never knew that due to an unfortunate misunderstanding I would end up
languishing in jail with my life at a crossroad. I for one thought that
everything in the proceeding was genuine without a hidden connotation,
but to the contrary the promises, the judgment and the current events
have left me bewildered and wondering whether my civil liberties and
rights were ever considered with honesty; and whether "Law and justice
was executed faithfully". To reiterate I don't have a legal counsel to guide
me through this difficult time in life since my former counsel pulled off, I'm
therefore humbly seeking for your fatherly help on the same. I have not
heard from your honorable office about the letter I wrote on the
01.06.2006. Hence it's content still remains unconsidered. Please would
you kindly assign me a public defender or help me out
(R., p.67.) Again, the district court forwarded the letter to Mr. Kumm, who took no
action. (R., pp.83 - 84.)
On May 29, 2007, Mr. Ochieng filed a "MOTION FOR OBTAINING AN ORDER
MODIFYING THE ORIGI'NAL CONVICTION AND SENTENCE," (R., pp.58 - 66.)
Mr. Ochieng captioned the pleading, "Collins Ochieng, Defendant v. The People of the
Sfafe of Idaho, Plaintiff," and included his criminal case number, Case No. 2005-1505
FE, in the caption. (R., p.58.) In his Motion, Mr. Ochieng asks the district court "for an

order modifying the original conviction and sentence" based on his ineffective
assistance of counsel. (R., p.58.) Mr. Ochieng states that the basis for his claim is that,
because of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Ochieng's guilty plea was not
voluntarily or knowingly made. (R., p.58.)
Specifically, Mr. Ochieng alleges in his "Motion," that his defense attorney:
failed to conduct a complete investigation of the facts, including failing to
interview an eye witness and to properly examine the incident report, before
recommending to Mr. Ochieng that he enter plea of guilt, (R., p.61,q 8; p.63, p.1);
s

made a false assurances andlor promises regarding his case, including that

Mr. Ochieng would receive, as a probable maximum penalty, a six month probation term
because of the attorney's good relationship with the judge and the prosecuting attorney,
(R., ~ . 5 9 , l l 2~; . 6 2 , 1 2 ) ;
s

failed to make a motion to the district court to withdraw the plea agreement after

recognizing and admitting in open court that he had "misadvised" his client, (R., p.62, fl
3);
failed to file a motion to reduce Mr. Ochieng's sentence that the attorney had
promised he would file if Mr. Ochieng received a sentence greater than six months of
probation, (R., p.62,T 4);
failed to explain the nature of the charges or the plea agreement to Mr. Ochieng
before he signed the agreement, (R., p.60,

3; p.63, Part 2,

2);

failed to inform Mr. Ochieng that he could be deported or ordered into the
custody of the Idaho Department of Corrections as a result of pleading guilty to the
felony charge of "injury to children," (because the attorney, in fact, represented that he

would be put on probation for six months as a worse case scenario), ( R ; p.62, 7 5 ;
p.63, Part 2,711 - 2);
failed to conduct any investigation as to possible mitigating factors in favor of
Mr. Ochieng prior to recommending that Mr. Ochieng agree to plead guilty, (R., p.63,

7);
failed to assist Mr. Ochieng in the pre-sentence interview process because the
attorney went on vacation, which resulted in a pre-sentence interview in which the
investigator coached Mr. Ochieng regarding his answers and promised Mr. Ochieng that
she would recommend probation and that the judge would adopt her recommendation,
(R., p.68,74);
discussed with Mr. Ochieng, but failed to explain or to object in the criminal
proceeding to the untimely filing of the Pre-sentence Report and the inadequacy of the
pre-sentence investigator's investigation, (R., p.61, 17);
failed to conduct an adequate factual review or analysis by, among other things,
failing to review the incident report, (R., p.61,18); and
failed to request or obtain an interpreter for Mr. Ochieng at any time during the
criminal proceedings despite the attorney's knowledge that Mr. Ochieng was not fluent
in the English language, and did not fully understand the complexities of the
proceedings, (R., p. 64, Part 3, 7 1 - p. 65, Part 3, 73).
Mr. Ochieng alleged that, because of his inability to fully understand the
proceedings as a result of the language barrier, he relied entirely upon the advice and
counsel of his attorney for explanations, and in entering his guilty plea. (R., p.64, Part
3,

77

1 - 2; p.65,

7 5.)

He further alleged that, had he been "well advised by the

counsel way in advance that, he would be prejudiced by the institution of deportation
proceeding against him," he would not have entered his guilty plea. (R., p.63; see also,
p.64, Part 2,

fi 3 - 4.)

Accordingly, as a result of his attorney's ineffective assistance,

Mr. Ochieng alleged that his agreement to plead guilty was not voluntary or knowing.
(R., pp.60, 65 - 66.)
In "Conclusion", Mr. Ochieng contended that an application for post-conviction
relief filed "belatedly" can be made upon a showing of present need under "Standard
22-2.4(c), and that he made a sufficient showing of present need in his Motion.
(R., p.66.)

Mr. Ochieng also filed, under the same caption, a "MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL." (R., p.70.) On June 12, 2007, Mr. Ochieng filed a
"Motion to Correct Record and Address." Mr. Ochieng stated:
The defendant pro se notifies this court of change the defendants record,
concerning representation and address. Upon sentencing Attorney Kelly
Kumm, became slippery and eventually wrote the defendant that he had
NO OBLIGATION to represent the defendant, hereby find the defendants
reply to Kumm's letter to that effect. Hence, therefore any correspondent
regarding this case No. 2005-1505 FE should be directly with the
defendant as the defendant is trying to seek for a post conviction relief due
to IAC. Which ahs caused the defendant severe consequences than the
defendant was originally promised.
(R., p.72) (emphasis added.)
On July 3, 2007, Mr. Kumm filed a Notice of Withdrawal.

(R., pp.75 - 76.)

Mr. Kumm stated as his reason for withdrawal, that the district court had entered "a
Minute Entry and Order" on September 6, 2005, and that the time for appeal had
expired. (R., p.75.) Mr. Kumm was not a court appointed public defender and had been
privately retained by Mr. Ochieng. (R., p.24, p.49, fi 2.)

On August 28, 2007, Mr. Ochieng filed a "Motion for a Notice of Hearing," and
asked the district court for a hearing, and a writ ordering the District Director
Department of Homeland Security to release Mr. Ochieng into the custody of the State
of Idaho Department of Correction in order to attend the hearing. (R, p.77.)
The district court issued an Order Re: Motion on September 7, 2007, denying
Mr. Ochieng's "Motion." (R., p.79.) In its Order, the district court stated "tilt is not clear
to the Court whether the Motion for Obtaining an Order Modifying the Original
Conviction and Sentence is meant to be a Rule 35 Motion or a Petition for Post
Conviction Relief." (R., p.80.) Nonetheless, the court held, that under either avenue of
potentially requested relief, Mr. Ochieng's request must be denied as untimely.
(R., p.80.) The district court noted that the deadlines for a petition for post-conviction
relief and a motion to reduce his sentence under Rule 35 ran on October 16, 2006, and
September 2, 2005, respectively. (R., pp.80

- 81.)

Because Mr. Ochieng filed his

Motion on May 29,2007, it was untimely as to both. (R., pp.80

- 81.)

Mr. Ochieng filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order denying his
Motion on September 14, 2007. (R., pp.82 - 87.) In his Motion for Reconsideration,
Mr. Ochieng argued that his motion requesting relief from his conviction was timely
based on the principle of equitable tolling. (R., pp.83 - 87.) The district court denied
Mr. Ochieng's Motion for Reconsideration, finding that Mr. Ochieng failed to present
extraordinary circumstances that made it "impossible" for him to file his motion for relief
from his conviction in a timely manner. (R., pp.88 - 89.)
Mr. Ochieng filed a Notice of Appeal on September 29, 2007. (R., pp.1 - 2.) On
appeal, Mr. Ochieng contends that the district court committed reversible error in

dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief without providing 20 days notice of the
I

i

dismissal and without ruling on his motion for appointment of counsel

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it sua sponfe summarily dismissed, prior to any
response by the State, Mr. Ochieng's petition for post-conviction relief because
he failed to allege facts in his Petition that would defend against an affirmative
defense that the State was required to raise, or would waive?

2.

Did the district court err when it sua sponte summarily dismissed Mr. Ochieng's
petition for post-conviction relief without providing a notice of its intent to
dismiss?

3.

Did the district court err when is sua sponte summarily dismissed Mr. Ochieng's
petition for post-Conviction relief without ruling on Mr. Ochieng's motion for
appointment of counsel.

ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It, Sua S~onfe,Summarily
Dismissed Mr. Ochieng's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Based Upon Mr. Ochiena's
Failure To Plead Facts In His Petition That Would Defend Against An Affirmative
Defense Which The State Was Reauired To Raise
A.

Introduction
Mr. Ochieng asserts that the district court committed reversible error when it, sua

sponfe, dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that he failed to file
the Petition within the period allowed by the Statute of Limitations. Mr. Ochieng
contends that a failure to comply with the Statute of Limitations is an affirmative defense
that the State was required to have raised in response to his petition, or else the
defense would have been waived. Accordingly, Mr. Ochieng was not required in his
petition to plead facts that would defeat the affirmative defense. Mr. Ochieng asserts
that the district court committed reversible error in dismissing Mr. Ochieng's petition on
this basis, and asks that this Court vacate the Order and reinstate his petition for postconviction relief.

B.

The District Court Properlv Considered Mr. Ochiena's "Motion" As A Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief To Set Aside His Plea Of Guilt Based Upon Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel Brought Under The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures
In the instant case, the district court was "not clear" as to whether Mr. Ochieng

intended his Motion to be a request that the court reduce his sentence pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinaffer, Rule 35), or a petition for post-conviction relief
brought under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedures Act (hereinafter, UPCPA), 33 19

- 4901 et seq. (R., p. 80.) The district court considered Mr. Ochieng's motion under
both avenues of relief, and denied it as untimely under both. (R., pp.80 - 81.) The
district court properly considered Mr. Ochieng's Motion as a post-conviction petition,'
although its conclusion that dismissal was appropriate was in error.
"ldaho appellate courts have long held that with respect to post-judgment
pleadings filed by convicted defendants, substance governs over form, and a mislabled
pleading will be treated according to its substance." Schwartz v. State, 145 ldaho 186,
190, 177 P.3d 400, 404 (Ct. App. 2008). In State v. Jakoski, 139 ldaho 352, 79 P.3d
711 (2003), however, the ldaho Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals treatment
of Mr. Jakoski's motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed pursuant to I.C.R. 33(c) as a
petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at 355, 177 P.3d at 714. The Supreme Court
stated, "[ijt would be too much of a stretch to hold that a motion filed in a criminal case
can be considered as a pleading commencing civil litigation." Id.
The Supreme Court's statement in Jakoski v. State, id., did not over-turn the wellsettled principle that a post-judgment filing will be considered based on its substance,
not its form alone. See Schwartz, 145 ldaho 186, 177 P.3d 400 (applying principle to
post-conviction letter to the judge in criminal proceeding). In Jakoski, there was no

'

Mr. Ochieng does not contend that his Motion 'was intended or should have been
treated as a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35. He made no allegations in
his Motion that his sentence was excessive. Instead, his Motion clearly challenged the
validity of his conviction based on the fact that his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Ochieng
recognizes that Rule 35 does not provide a procedural avenue through which the relief
he requested could be granted. See State v. Sands, 121 ldaho 1023, 829 P.2d 1372
(Ct. App. 1992) (Holding that, "a motion which challenges the legality of a conviction on
the grounds that it was based on an invalid guilty plea is beyond the scope of a motion
brought under Rule 35" and, accordingly, did not reach the merits of the issue.)

contention that the substance of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea was intended to
be a petition for post-conviction relief, or was otherwise ambiguous. The motion was
filed in the criminal case, as a criminal motion brought pursuant to I.C.R. 33 and, at no
time during the proceeding, was there any contention that Mr. Jakoski intended to file a
motion post-conviction relief, but had done so incorrectly. Mr. Jakoski, in fact, had filed
previously a timely petition for post-conviction relief which the district court dismissed.
Id. at 354, 177 P.3d at 713. After the Court of Appeals upheld the district court's

dismissal, Jakoski v. State, 136 ldaho 280, 32 P.3d 672 (Ct. App. 2001), Mr. Jakoski
attempted another avenue, by filing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to
Rule 33 in the criminal case. Jakoski, 139 ldaho at 354, 79 P.3d at 713. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that the criminal motion was untimely, but
nonetheless, considered the motion, alternatively, as a petition for post-conviction relief.
Id. The Court of Appeals did not engage in a substantive analysis of the Rule 33 motion

to determine if it comported with the requirements of a petition for post-conviction relief
in either form or substance, and the Supreme Court reversed the decision. Id.
Thus, Jakoski does not prohibit a district court from ever construing a pro se
post-judgment filing in a criminal case as a petition for post-conviction relief. Jakoski
merely holds that a pleading that is intended to be and is, substantively, a criminal
motion, cannot itself be converted into a petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at 355,
177 P.3d at 715.
The ldaho Court of Appeals recently confirmed, in Schwaitz v. State, 145 ldaho
186, 177 P.3d 400, that the test to determine whether to treat an ambiguous pro se,
post-judgment filing as a post-conviction petition is to consider its substance and intent.

In Schwartz, the Court of Appeals considered whether a letter written to the district court
judge asking for assistance in preparing an application for post-conviction relief could
itself be considered an initial application for post-conviction relief. Id. at 188, 402.
Pursuant to this letter, the district court appointed Ms. Schwartz counsel to assist her in
bringing her claim(s) for post-conviction relief. Id. Her counsel, however, failed to file
the petition.

Id.

He then filed a motion to extend the deadline, and took full

responsibility for having failed to file the petition. Id. The district court denied the
motion to extend the deadline. Id. A year later, Ms. Schwartz, pro se, filed a Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief. Id. The district court appointed new counsel to represent
Ms. Schwartz, and ultimately dismissed the Petition. Id.
On appeal of the dismissal, Ms. Schwartz argued that her first letter requesting
appointment of counsel should be construed as an initial Petition for Post-Conviction.
Id. While the Court of Appeals rejected Ms. Schwartz's argument, and held that letter

could not be construed as a petition, it first considered both the substance and the intent
of the letter. Id. at 191 - 92, 177 P.3d at 404 - 05. The district court noted that neither
Ms. Schwartz or her counsel had objected when the district court failed to open a
separate civil case after receiving the letter that Mr. Schwartz contended was meant to
be a petition for post-conviction relief; that counsel averred in a motion to extend the
time for filing a petition that he "was unaware fhaf Ms. Schwartz did not have a Post
Conviction Relief Petition already filed, and, that counsel conceded at oral argument
that neither Ms. Schwartz, nor the district court considered the letter to be an application
for post-conviction relief. Id. The Court of Appeals noted, furthermore, that the letter
stated that "[Ms. Schwartz] did not understand her guilty plea" which "appears to be a

basis to request to have her guilty plea withdrawn pursuant to I.C.R. 33." Id. at 191, 177
P.3d at 405. The appellate court concluded, therefore, "that the letter's substance did
not provide a sufficient basis for this Court to treat the letter as Schwartz's initial
application." Id.
In the instant case, the district court properly recognized that, in both form and
substance, Mr. Ochieng's Motion, was in fact, a petition for post-conviction relief. Idaho
Code $ 19 - 4903 governs the content of post-conviction applications, and states:
The application shall identify the proceedings in which the applicant was
convicted, give the date of the entry of the judgment and sentence
complained of, specifically set forth the grounds upon which the
application is based, and clearly state the relief desired. Facts within the
personal knowledge of the applicant shall be set forth separately from
other allegations of fact and shall be verified as provided in section 194902. Affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations shall
be attached to the application or the application shall recite why they are
not attached. The application shall identify all previous proceedings,
together with the grounds therein asserted, taken by the applicant to
secure relief from his conviction or sentence. Argument, citations, and
discussion of authorities are unnecessary.

Although Mr. Ochieng incorrectly included his criminal case number in the
caption, and failed to use the precise words "Petition for Post-Conviction Relief' in the
title, Mr. Ochieng's Motion is clearly intended to be and is, substantively, a petition for
post-conviction relief.

Mr. Ochieng included the proper civil caption of "Collins

Ochieng v. The People of fhe Sfafe of ldaho." (R., p.58.) He properly identified the
proceedings in which he was convicted, and gave the date of his convietion and his
sentence complained of. (R., pp.58

-

59, 63 & 64.)

He specifically set forth the

grounds upon which the application was based, including at least eight different grounds

A

in which he believed his attorney provided him ineffective assistance of counsel (which
are set out in detail above and incorporated herein by reference). (See R., pp.58

- 66.)

He further specifically and clearly stated the relief he desired, which was that the
district court "modify his original conviction and sentence due to ineffective assistance of
I

counsel." (R., p.66; see also, R. pp.58, 63, 64.) In his "Conclusion," Mr. Ochieng
specifically discusses application for post-conviction relief. (R., p.66.)'

Accordingly,

Mr. Ochieng's Motion complied substantially with the form requirements for a petition for
I

1

post-conviction relief.
Moreover, the substance of his claims were entirely a challenge to his guilty plea
as unknowing and involuntary due to his ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.58 67.) "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the
post-conviction procedure act." Baker v. State, 142, ldaho 411, 417, 128 P.3d 948, 954
(Ct. App. 2005) (citing Murray v. State, 121 ldaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30
(Ct. App. 1992)). In fact, once the time to appeal has run, the only mechanism through
which a defendant may challenge his guilty plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel is through a petition for post-conviction relief. Jakoski, 139 ldaho at 355, 79
P.3d at 714 (holding district court lacked jurisdiction to consider motion to withdraw
guilty plea after time to appeal judgment expired).
Mr. Ochieng's motion was, in both form and substance, a proper petition for postconviction relief.

Mr. Ochieng failed to comply with the verification requirement of the petition for postconviction relief. Such a technical deficiency, however, would not defeat a petition that
is otherwise sufficient in content prior to the applicant being given notice of and the
opportunity to correct this deficiency. Freeman v. State, 116 ldaho 985, 986, 783 P.2d
324,325 - 26 (Ct. App. 1989).

C.

The District Court Erred In Sua Sponte Summarilv Dismissing Mr. Ochieng's
Petition On The Basis That His Petition Was Untimelv Because Failure To
Comply With The Statute Of Limitations Is An Affirmative Defense That Was
Reauired To Have Been Raised Bv The State Or Else Waived
In Pratt v. State, 134 ldaho 581, 6 P.3d 831 (2000), the ldaho Supreme Court

summarized the standards applicable for determining whether a petition for postconviction relief was properly granted as follows:
[I]n determining whether a motion for summary disposition is properly
granted, the Court reviews the facts in a light most favorable to the
petitioner and determines whether the facts would entitle petitioner to relief
if accepted as true. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 ldaho 319, 321, 900
P.2d 795, 797 (1995). A petition for post-conviction relief will be subject to
summary dismissal if the petitioner has not presented evidence
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon
which the applicant bears the burden of proof. Berg v. State, 131 ldaho
517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998). A petition for post-conviction
relief, based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, will
accordingly survive a motion for summary dismissal if the petitioner
establishes: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel's
performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to
whether the deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case. Saykhamchone, 127
ldaho at 323, 900 P.2d at 799 (citing lvey v. State, 123 ldaho 77, 80, 844
P.2d 706, 709 (1992)).
Pratt, 134 ldaho at 583 - 84, 6 P.3d at 833 - 34.
Summary dismissal of a petition is appropriate if the evidence submitted in
support of the petition, "raises no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief." I.C. § 19-9406(b) &
(c); Anderson v. State, 133 ldaho 788, 788, 992 P.2d 783, 793 (Ct. App. 1999). The
district court may summarily dismiss a petition that raises no genuine issue of material
fact either upon motion by the State, or sua sponte after providing the applicant 20 days
notice of its intent to dismiss. I.C. 3 19-1904(b)&(c); see Saykhamchone, 127 ldaho

319, 900 P.2d 795; Anderson, 133 ldaho at 788, 992 P.2d at 793; Gibbs v. State, 103
ldaho 758,653 P.2d 813 (Ct. App. 1982).
The district court failed to consider Mr. Ochieng's petition for post-conviction
relief on any of the grounds stated therein.

Instead, the district court summarily

dismissed Mr. Ochieng's petition as untimely before the State filed any response.
Failure to comply with the Statute of Limitations is an affirmative defense that the State
would have had to have raised in its response to Mr. Ochieng's petition, or else it would
have been considered waived. Mr. Ochieng was not required to set forth facts within his
petition that would defend against an affirmative defense that his claim was time barred.
Accordingly, the district court committed reversible error when it summarily dismissed
Mr. Ochieng's petition for post-conviction relief as untimely.
The basis for the district court's dismissal of Mr. Ochieng's petition for postconviction relief was that it was filed outside of the time period allowed by the Statute of
Limitations for filing a petition for post-conviction relief. The statute provides, in relevant
part:
An application may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or
from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is
later.
I.C. § 19 - 4902.

A failure to comply with the Statute of Limitations in filing a post-

conviction proceeding, however, is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the
State, or else it is waived. Cole v. State, 135 ldaho 107, 110, 15 P.3d 820, 823 (2000)
(citing Anderson, 133 ldaho 788, 992 P.2d 783). It is not an essential element of the
petitioner's claim. Id. The failure to allege facts sufficiently within a petition to avoid
dismissal for failure to comply with the Statute of Limitations does not defeat an

otherwise viable claim for post-conviction relief. See Anderson, 133 ldaho at 794, 992
P.2d at 789 (vacating district court order dismissing petition on the basis that petitioner
failed to allege facts in petition for tolling relief.)
In the instant case, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Ochieng's petion,
sua sponfe, before the State filed any response to the Petition in which it could have
raised an affirmative defense. The district court also failed to consider Mr. Ochieng's
petition on its merits in any manner. Accordingly, the district court failed to make any
finding that would support dismissal of the petition. See Saykhamchone, 127 ldaho at

321,900 P.2d at 797 (court must find that no issue of material fact in dispute that would
entitle petitioner to relief). The district court clearly erred in dismissing Mr. Ochieng's
petition based on its finding that Mr. Ochieng failed to comply with the Statute of
Limitations.

The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Sua Sponfe Summarily
Dismissed Mr. Ochiena's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Without Notice
A.

introduction
The district court summarily dismissed Mr. Ochieng's petition for post- conviction

relief, sua sponte, without providing notice to Mr. Ochieng. In so doing, the district court
denied Mr. Ochieng of the substantial right of receiving notice of and the opportunity to
be heard regarding the viability of his petition.
harmless.

The district court's error was not

Accordingly, Mr. Ochieng contends that the district court committed

reversible error, and asks this court to vacate the district court's order dismissing
Mr. Ochieng's petition without notice.

B.

The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act Requires That A District Court Give
A Petitioner Sufficient Notice Prior To Summarily Dismissinq A Petition For PostConviction Relief
As mentioned above, the district court may summarily dismiss a petition that

raises no genuine issue of material fact either upon motion by the State, or sua sponte
after providing the applicant 20 days notice of its intent to dismiss.

I.C. § 19-

1904(b)&(c); see Saykhamchone, 127 ldaho 319, 900 P.2d 795; Anderson, 133 ldaho
at 788, 992 P.2d at 793; Gibbs, 103 ldaho 758, 653 P.2d 813. Within the twenty-day
time period, the applicant "is entitled to present supplemental evidence to support the
claims." Anderson, 133 ldaho at 788, 992 P.2d at 793.
The purpose of the notice requirement of I.C. § 19-1904(b)&(c) is to give the
petitioner an opportunity to challenge the decision before it is finalized.

Baruth v.

Gardner, 110 ldaho 156, 159-60, 715 P.2d 369, 371-72 (Ct. App. 1986). Thus, this
requirement is strict; it makes no difference whether the petitioner's claims are
meritorious or not. Cherniwchan v. State, 99 ldaho 128, 129-30, 578 P.2d 244, 245-46
(1978). Moreover, vague notice of the district court's intent to dismiss is insufficient.
The district court must be specific as to the bases for the intended dismissal so as to
provide the petitioner with a meaningful opportunity to respond. Banks v. State, 123
ldaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993). It is not sufficient to merely recite the language
from section 19-4906 and state a conclusion. Id. If the district court fails to give the
petitioner the required notice and opportunity to respond, or if the district court's notice
is impermissibly vague, the petition must be reinstated. Pelfier, 119 ldaho at 456-57,
458, 808 P.2d at 375-76, 377 (failure to give any notice); Banks, 123 ldaho at 954, 855
P.2d at 39 (notice was impermissibly vague).

The remedy for a defective notice of intent to dismiss in the case of postconviction petition is to vacate the dismissal order and remand the matter for further
proceedings. Grifin v. State, 142 ldaho 438, 442, 128 P.3d 975, 979 (Ct. App. 2006).
In Griffin, the ldaho Court of Appeals stated:
The opportunity for an applicant to adequately and appropriately respond
to the district court's notice, in order to avoid summary dismissal and have
the merits of his or her application considered at an evidentiary hearing, is
a substantial right. When that right is affected by a defective notice of
proposed dismissal, this Court cannot disregard the error.

Id.
In this case, Mr. Ochieng received no notice whatsoever of the district court's
intent to dismiss his petition. In so doing, the district court committed reversible error,
and Mr. Ochieng asks this court to vacate the district court's order dismissing, and to
reinstate, his petition. See Griffin, 142 ldaho at 442, 128 P.3d at 979.3

In the case of a defective or insufficient notice, if there is some indication within the
record that the applicant otherwise understood the basis for the dismissal and had a
meaningful opportunity to respond, the error may be deemed harmless. Baker v. State,
142 ldaho 41 1, 422, 128 P.3d 948, 959 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Downing, 132 ldaho at
864, 979 P.2d at 1222); see also, Franck -Tell v. State, 143 ldaho 664, 672, 152 P.3d
25, 33 (Ct. App. 2006) (reversing district court for failing to provide 20 day notice of
intent to dismiss where record did not demonstrate that applicant understood grounds
for dismissal.) Mr. Ochieng contends that this analysis does not apply in the case
where the district court fails to provide any notice whatsoever of its intent to dismiss.

The District Court Erred In Failina To Appoint Counsel To Represent Mr. Ochiena In His
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Prior To Sua Sponte Summarily Dismissins His
Petition
A.

Introduction
Mr. Ochieng filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel to assist him with his

petition for post-conviction relief. In his motion, he set forth that he was unable to pay
the costs of an attorney. (R., p.70.) Because Mr. Ochieng set forth facts that, at a
minimum, raised the possibility of a valid post-conviction claim for relief, Mr. Ochieng
was entitled to appointment of counsel to assist him in bringing his claims. The district
court failed to rule on Mr. Ochieng's motion for appointment of counsel before
summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition.

In so doing, the district court

committed reversible error.
B.

The District Court Erred In Failina To Appoint Counsel To Represent Mr. Ochienq
In His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Prior To Sua Sponte Summarily
Dismissing His Petition
A request for appointment of counsel to assist in a claim for post-conviction relief

brought under the UPCPA is governed by I.C.
140 ldaho 789, 792

- 93, & n.

3 19 - 4904. See Charboneau v. State,

1, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 - 112, & n. 1 (2004) (citing

Brown V. State, 135 ldaho 676,679, 23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001) (superceded by sfafute on
other grounds).)

The statute provides that "a court-appointed attorney 'may be made

available' to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of representation."
Charboneau, 140 ldaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111. The decision of whether or not to
appoint counsel is within the district court's discretion. Id. (citing Fox v. State, 129

ldaho 881, 934 P.2d 947 (Ct. App. 1997.) "If the petitioner alleges facts to raise the
possibility of a valid claim, the district court should appoint counsel in order to give the
petitioner an opportunity with counsel to properly allege the necessary supporting facts."
Charboneau, 140 ldaho at 793,102 P.3d at 1112
Moreover, in Charboneau v. State, the ldaho Supreme Court warned that the
district courts must consider its prior "admonition" regarding "typical problems with pro
se pleadings" when deciding whether to grant a request for appointment of counsel, Id.
at 793, 102 P.3d at 1119. That admonition, set forth in Brown v. State, was:
When applying that standard to pro se applications for appointment
of counsel, the trial court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits
filed by a pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete.
Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because they
do not exist, they also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner
simply does not know what are the essential elements of a claim.
It is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of the
claimed defects so he has an opportunity to respond and to give the trial
court an adequate basis for deciding the need for counsel based upon the
merits of the claims. If the court decides that the claims in the petition are
frivolous, the court should provide sufficient information regarding the
basis for its ruling to enable the petitioner to supplement the request with
the necessary additional facts, if they exist. Although the petitioner is not
entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the record for
possible nonfrivolous claims, he should be provided with a meaningful
opportunity to supplement the record and to renew his request for courtappointed counsel prior to the dismissal of his petition where, as here, he
has alleged facts supporting some elements of a valid claim.
Brown, 135 ldaho at 679, 23 P.3d at 141
Mr. Ochieng set forth sufficient factual allegations to establish a possible viable
claim for post-conviction relief. Mr. Ochieng alleges in his petition that his guilty plea
was not knowingly or voluntarily made because of his counsel's ineffective assistance.

"A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-

conviction procedure act." Baker, 142 ldaho at 417, 128 P.3d at 954 (citing Murray, 121
ldaho at 924-25, 828 P.2d at 1329-30.
A two-prong test is applied to determine to whether counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel. First, the defendant must "show that trial counsel's performance
was deficient." Medina v. Sfafe, 132 ldaho 722, 726, 979 P.2d 124, 127 (Ct. App.1999)
(citing Sfrickland v.Washingfon, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); Aragon v.
State, 114 ldaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho
649, 652, 946 P.2d 71, 74 (Ct. App.1997)). Second, the defendant must show that he
or she was prejudiced by the deficiency, which is defined as demonstrating a,
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Sfrickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A
defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered
the outcome in the case." Id. at 693 (emphasis added). The "result of a proceeding can
be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of
counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the
outcome." Id. at 694. Instead, a lesser standard is applied; that is, whether there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id.
Mr. Ochieng set forth factual allegations that support at least a possibility of a
viable claim for relief to set aside his guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of
counsel.

Mr. Ochieng set forth, specifically, numerous distinct bases for which he

believed his attorney provided him ineffective assistance of counsel (which are set out
in detail above and incorporated herein by reference) that may be recognized as valid

bases for a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. (See R., pp.58 - 66.) See, e.g.,
Schoger v. State, - P.3d -,

2008 WL 3905424 (Ct. App. 2008) (remanding for

evidentiary hearing where record showed facts sufficient to raise an inference that
defendant would have plead differently had counsel properly advised her on the law);
Plant v. State, 143 ldaho 758, 152 P.3d 629 (Ct. App. 2006) (counsel has duty to
adequately investigate criminal case prior to advising defendant regarding guilty plea);
State v. Mathews, 133 ldaho 300, 986 P.2d 323 (Idaho 1999) (counsel has duty to
adequately investigate criminal case); Murray v. State, 121 ldaho 918, 828 P.2d 1323
(Ct. App. 1992) (failure to file Rule 35 motion may be basis for ineffective assistance
claim); People v. Correa, 108 111.2d 541, 485 N.E.2d 307 (111. 1985) (overruled on other
grounds) (counsel's failure to advise defendant of deportation consequence of guilty
plea constituted ineffective assistance of c ~ u n s e l ) . ~
Mr. Ochieng further alleged that, because he was not fluent in English, he relied
on his attorney's advice in entering his guilty plea, and that he had he been "well
advised by the counsel way in advance that, he would be prejudiced by the institution of
deportation proceeding against him," he would not have entered his guilty plea.
(R., p.64, Part 3,77 1 - 2; p. 65,Y 5; p.63; see also, p.64, Part 2, 7 3 - 4.) Accordingly,
as a result of his attorney's ineffective assistance, Mr. Ochieng alleged that his

In State v. Correa, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the trial court's decision in a
post-conviction proceeding setting aside the plaintiffs guilty plea on the basis that she
had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The plaintiff alleged that she had been
given incorrect advice regarding the immigration consequences of her guilty plea.
Correa, however, applied a different standard of proof for the claim on post-conviction
relief which was impliedly overruled by Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366
(1985). See People v. Black, 207 III.App.3d 304, 309-10, 152 III.Dec. 476, 480 (111.
Ct. App. 1991). The general principle for which it is cited, however, is still good law.

agreement to plead guilty was not voluntary or knowing. Mr. Ochieng further alleged
that he contended to his attorney that he was not guilty. (R., p.52, 3 2; see also PSI,
pp.2 - 3; Letter from John Warner, Idaho Department of Corrections, dated July 14,
2006, and attached documents verifying Mr. Ochieng's statements regarding
communications from victim).
Mr. Ochieng's petition set forth facts sufficient to establish a possible viable claim
for post-conviction relief.

Under the circumstances, there is at least a reasonable

probability that had Mr. Ochieng realized that he could be deported or sent to prison, as
a result of his plea of guilty, instead of being placed on probation for six months as he
contends that his attorney assured him would be the outcome, he would not have plead
guilty. As such, he was entitled to both sufficient notice of the district's court's intent to
dismiss his petition, and appointment of counsel to assist him in supplementing his
record to adequately support his claims. The district court committed reversible error in
failing to appoint Mr. Ochieng counsel prior to summarily dismissing his petition.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Ochieng respectfully requests that this court vacate the district court's order
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 3othday of September, 2008.
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